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I. INTRODUCTION
The bitter dispute over the proper treatment of Theresa Marie
Schiavo-a severely brain damaged woman, unable to communicate and
with no living will or advance directive-has garnered enormous attention
in the media, both national and international. What began as a heated
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disagreement between Ms. Schiavo's husband and parents has
mushroomed into a massive political conflict involving privacy advocates
on one side, and right to life and disability activists on the other. The battle
has raged on the editorial pages of the world's newspapers, in the courts,
and ultimately, in the legislative and executive branches of the Florida
state government. After nearly three years of acrimonious litigation
between Michael Schiavo (Ms. Schiavo's husband) and the Schindler
family (Ms. Schiavo's parents), a Florida court ordered that nutrition and
hydration for Ms. Schiavo be discontinued. Six days after implementation
of the court's order, the Florida Legislature passed "Terri's Law,"
authorizing the Governor, under certain prescribed circumstances, to issue
a one-time stay of court-ordered withdrawal of life-sustaining measures,
and to appoint a guardian ad litem to review the matter and report back to
the executive branch and the chief judge of the relevant Florida court.
Pursuant to this new authority, the Governor stayed the order issued by the
court, and nutrition and hydration were restored to Ms. Schiavo.
To date, the public debate on this matter has been framed as a conflict
between or a balancing of abstract concepts such as "the right to die," "the
sanctity of life," and "the rights of the disabled." Little scholarly attention
has been paid, however, to an enormously important question at the heart
of this matter, namely, what the proper roles of the various branches of
government are in a case such as Schiavo's. The proper question is not
whether the government has a role in a dispute such as this-it clearly
became involved once the matter moved to the state courts-but rather
how the government should be involved. Which branch, if any, should
have the last word in such a dispute? In these cases, should the relationship
between governmental branches be hierarchical or complementary? Which
branch of government is best situated to resolve these disputes? This
Article, using the Schiavo case as the relevant point of departure, essays
to address these questions. Specifically, the questions presented are
twofold: (1) Were the Florida Legislature's (and by extension, the
Governor's) actions in the Schiavo case consistent with the constitutional
principles of separation of powers? (2) If so, did the actions of the
executive and legislative branches in this case promote or undermine the
purposes and logic of the Florida laws governing end-of-life
decisionmaking, taken as a whole? That is, is Terri's Law wise public
policy from a structural, governmental view?
Part II of this Article sets forth the relevant factual predicates
underlying the Schiavo case, describing the circumstances of Ms.
Schiavo's illness and incapacity, the procedural history of the legal
dispute, and the legislative (and ultimately executive) response. To
properly analyze Terri's Law according to separation of powers principles;
it is crucial to give a full and precise account of the nature and character
of the various actions taken by the relevant governmental branches. What
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is the proper way to characterize what happened here? Did the Florida
Legislature and Governor Jeb Bush merely intervene in a finally
adjudicated matter because they disapproved of the result, or on the other
hand, did the political branches constitutionally (and wisely) exercise their
powers in order to advance a legitimate governmental interest? Answering
these questions depends on a very clear understanding of the facts.
Part Ifl of this Article explores the relevant legal authorities on the
issues of separation of powers, guardianship, and withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures. To discern whether Terri's Law and the Governor's
actions run afoul of the separation of powers, it is necessary to understand
the area of the law in which they occurred. More importantly, to
normatively assess the actions of the governmental branches, it is
necessary to appreciate the values that the Florida guardianship and end-
of-life regulatory framework seeks to defend and the harms and abuses
that it seeks to avoid.
Part IV of this Article synthesizes both the factual predicates and the
relevant legal authorities in an effort to draw a conclusion about the
legitimacy of Terri's Law (and the Governor's actions pursuant to it) in
light of both the doctrine of separation of powers and the purpose and
logic of the Florida regulatory scheme in this domain, taken as a whole.
Before moving forward, it is useful to note briefly what this Article
does not purport to address. This Article is not about "the right to die" or
"the right to life" in the abstract. Indeed, it does not even venture a guess
as to who-Michael Schiavo or the Schindler family-is properly
representing the wishes and best interests of Theresa Marie Schiavo. These
are surely important questions, but they are beyond the scope of the
present inquiry. This Article is intentionally agnostic on the question of
how finally to treat Ms. Schiavo. Rather, the object of this Article is to
explore a vexing question regarding the separation of powers in the
domain of guardianship and end-of-life decisionmaking. In this way, the
inquiry is procedural, but located in a particular substantive context.
II. BACKGROUND
In describing the facts in this case, it is worthwhile to highlight
common errors made by commentators and even parties to the present
case. Some commentators have framed this matter simply as the case of an
incapacitated woman wishing to die, but being ghoulishly kept alive by her
parents (and their activist supporters) with the aid of the Governor and the
legislature. As the following account of the factual underpinnings at work
here will demonstrate, it is not nearly so simple. There are numerous
conflicts and ambiguities-particularly regarding Ms. Schiavo's
intentions-that attend this case. To fully and fairly venture an argument
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
regarding the proper role of government in a case such as this, it is crucial
to understand and appreciate these complexities.
A. Ms. Schiavo's Illness and Incapacity
On February 25, 1990, Theresa Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest.'
During the several minutes prior to the arrival of the paramedics, Ms.
Schiavo suffered from anoxia (loss of oxygen to the brain), causing serious
brain damage.2 She lost consciousness and fell into a coma.3 Doctors later
concluded that her heart attack was due to an imbalance in her potassium
level.4 The cause of this dramatic drop has not been clearly identified.5
Ms. Schiavo spent the next two and a half months at a Florida hospital,
eventually emerging from her comatose state, but not regaining
consciousness.6 Thereafter, she was discharged to a rehabilitation facility.7
One and a half months later, she was transferred to another hospital facility
for additional rehabilitation measures.8 In September 1990 she came home,
but only weeks later, she returned to a rehabilitation facility.9
The clinical records in Ms. Schiavo's case file show that she was not
responsive to various tests, including neurological and swallowing
examinations.'" Following months of therapy, Ms. Schiavo was formally
deemed by physicians to be in a "persistent vegetative state."' ' "Persistent
vegetative state" is a diagnostic term of art developed by the American
Academy of Neurology:
The vegetative state is a clinical condition of complete
unawareness of the self and the environment, accompanied by
sleep-wake cycles, with either complete or partial
preservation of hypothalamic and brain-stem autonomic
functions. In addition, patients in a vegetative state show no
evidence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary
behavioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or noxious
stimuli; show no evidence of language comprehension or
expression; have bowel and bladder incontinence; and have
1. Jay Wolfson, A Report to Governor Jeb Bush in the Matter of Theresa Marie Schiavo,
at 7 (Dec. 1, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 9.
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variably preserved cranial-nerve and spinal reflexes. We
define persistent vegetative state as a vegetative state present
one month after acute traumatic or nontraumatic brain injury
or lasting for at least one month in patients with degenerative
or metabolic disorders or developmental malformations. 2
More importantly for present purposes, "persistent vegetative state" is also
a legal category, defined by Florida law as "a permanent and irreversible
condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence of
voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind. (b) An inability to
communicate or interact purposefully with the environment."' 3 The
significance of this legal definition to the Schiavo case is discussed below.
Ms. Schiavo received rehabilitation therapy and treatment at various
locations throughout 1990, ultimately returning to a skilled care facility in
Florida. 4 Neurological exams and physical, occupational, and speech
therapy continued through 1994.'5
Ms. Schiavo is not in a coma.'6 She has cycles of wakefulness and
sleep. 7 She does not speak.' 8 When she is awake, her eyes are open, she
groans, and she makes noises that suggest crying or laughter." Her eyes
seem to track movement.2" There is videotape footage in which Ms.
Schiavo appears to smile at her mother and her eyes seem to follow the
movement of a balloon held by her father.2' Observers, including the
guardian ad litem appointed (and later dismissed) for Ms. Schiavo, have
been unable to independently determine that these "were consistent,
repetitive, intentional, reproducible, interactive, and aware activities.""
With the aid of their retained experts, Michael Schiavo and the Schindler
family vigorously dispute the significance of these gestures and actions,
and they strongly disagree as to whether they indicate cognitive or merely
reflexive function.23
12. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Am. Acad. of Neurology, MedicalAspects of the
Persistent Vegetative State-First of Two Parts, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1499 (1994).
13. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(12) (2003).
14. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 8-9.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 29-30; Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
18. Wolfson, supra note l, at 9.
19. Id. at 30.
20. Id.
21. Brief of Amici Curiae Not Dead Yet et al. in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Schindler v. Schiavo, No. 8:03-CV- 1 860-T-26-TGW (M.D. Fla. dismissed
Oct. 10, 2003).
22. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 301
23. Schiavo v. Schindler, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov.
22, 2002).
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Prior testing performed in 1991, 1992, and 1993 found that Ms.
Schiavo lacked the capacity to swallow on her own.24 No such testing has
been performed since that time.25 The Schindler family and its experts
argue that Ms. Schiavo could benefit from swallow therapy; they argue
that, at the very least, testing for swallow potential should be conducted for
Ms. Schiavo. 26 If Ms. Schiavo can swallow (or could be made capable of
swallowing), artificial hydration and nutrition could be removed without
resulting in Ms. Schiavo's demise, rendering moot the most hotly
contested questions in the present dispute.27
Finally, and importantly, Ms. Schiavo's condition is not imminently
life threatening. If she continues to receive artificial nutrition and
hydration, or develops the capacity to swallow on her own, she is expected
to live for many more years.28
B. Medical Malpractice Suit
In the early 1990s, shortly after Ms. Schiavo's collapse, Michael
Schiavo brought a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of himself and
his wife against the obstetrician who had previously been providing
fertility therapy to Ms. Schiavo.29 In 1993, the action was resolved in favor
of the Schiavos, resulting in awards of $750,000 for economic damages to
Ms. Schiavo and $300,000 to Michael Schiavo for loss of consortium and
non-economic damages.3 ° These damages were calculated in reliance on
Michael Schiavo's testimony that he would provide health care for his
incapacitated wife, whom he expected to live out her normal life span.31
If Ms. Schiavo were to die, the balance of her award would pass to
Michael Schiavo under the Florida laws of intestacy.32 If Michael Schiavo
divorced Ms. Schiavo, the balance of the funds would likely pass to her
parents.33
There is some dispute about the disposition of Ms. Schiavo's award.
According to the recently filed guardian ad litem report, the money was
held in trust, with SouthTrust Bank as the guardian and independent
24. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 27.
25. See id. at 28.
26. See generally Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Jeb Bush, Governor of the State of
Florida, in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Schindler v. Schiavo, No. 8:03-
CV- 1 860-T-26-TGW (M.D. Fla. dismissed Oct. 10, 2003).
27. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 27.
28. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
29. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 9.
30. Id. at 9; Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 178.
3 1. See, e.g., Jurisdiction Brief of Petitioners, Robert and Mary Schindler at 1, Schindler v.
Schiavo, 855 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2003).
32. Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 178.
33. Id.
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trustee.34 The report notes that the fund was "meticulously managed and
accounted for and Michael Schiavo had no control over its use. 35 The
report concludes that the records on this point are "excellently maintained"
and reveal no evidence of mismanagement of Ms. Schiavo's estate.36 On
the other hand, it has been reported that Michael Schiavo has had access
to Ms. Schiavo's funds.37 According to one account, Michael Schiavo has
spent the balance of his and his wife's medical malpractice award on the
legal efforts described below.
38
C. The Litigation: Regarding the Guardianship of Theresa
Marie Schiavo
Seeds of the dispute. In early 1994, Ms. Schiavo developed a urinary
tract infection.39 Michael Schiavo elected not to treat the infection, and
simultaneously requested a "Do Not Resuscitate" order for Ms. Schiavo,
in the event that she suffers another cardiac arrest.40 In response, the
nursing facility formally resisted the order. Michael Schiavo cancelled
the order but relocated Ms. Schiavo to another facility.
42
Believing that Michael Schiavo was not acting in their daughter's best
interests, the Schindlers initiated an action to remove him as her legal
guardian. 43 This effort was unsuccessful, and it was ultimately dismissed
with prejudice by the court in 1996." Relations with Michael Schiavo
deteriorated dramatically to the point where a court had to order Mr.
Schiavo to share copies of Ms. Schiavo's medical reports with her parents
and to permit health care personnel to discuss Ms. Schiavo's condition
with her parents.45
In 1997, Michael Schiavo initiated proceedings to withdraw nutrition
and hydration from Ms. Schiavo.46 The first petition to discontinue life
support was filed in May 1998.47 Pursuant to standard procedure, the court
appointed a guardian ad litem (Richard Pearse, an attorney) to review
34. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Bush Seeks Probe of 10 Hang-Ups in Schiavo Case, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 23,
2003, Metro section, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Wolfson, supra 1, at 10.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 9-10.
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Michael Schiavo's request.4" Mr. Pearse determined, in a report submitted
on December 20, 1998, that Ms. Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative
state with no chance of improvement.49 He concluded, however, that the
hearsay evidence adduced by Michael Schiavo in support of his claim that
his wife's wishes would have been to discontinue life-sustaining nutrition
and hydration under the present circumstances was not clear and
convincing" and thereby failed to satisfy the requisite standard of proof
under Florida law.5 Moreover, Mr. Pearse noted that Michael Schiavo's
hearsay testimony about his wife's intent was "necessarily adversely
affected by the obvious financial benefit to him of being the sole heir at
law. 52 Mr. Pearse was particularly struck by Michael Schiavo's dramatic
change in attitude towards his wife's treatment after the malpractice award
was granted.53 Mr. Pearse recommended that Michael Schiavo's petition
for the removal of the feeding tube be denied, unless the court felt,
contrary to Mr. Pearse's conclusion, that the hearsay evidence regarding
Ms. Schiavo's intent was clear and convincing.54 Mr. Pearse also
recommended that a guardian ad litem represent Ms. Schiavo's interests
in all future proceedings. Michael Schiavo filed a "Suggestion of Bias"
against Mr. Pearse shortly thereafter, arguing that the guardian ad litem
unfairly focused on Michael Schiavo's conflict of interest and not on the
Schindler family's. 6 He additionally argued that Mr. Pearse's report
contained certain omissions and factual errors.57 Mr. Pearse submitted his
petition for additional authority or discharge in February 1999.58 He
received his discharge four months later, and no new guardian ad litem
was appointed. 9
On February 11, 2000, the trial court ordered Ms. Schiavo's nutrition
and hydration withdrawn.6' There followed a protracted and acrimonious
struggle in which Michael Schiavo sought to establish that his wife's intent
under the circumstances would be to terminate nutrition and hydration. In
support of this proposition, he testified that his wife had, in various
conversations many years prior, orally expressed to him that she would not
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 11-12.
51. Id. at 22 (citing State v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990)).
52. Id. at 12.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 13.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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want to continue living under artificial life support.6 Specifically, he
testified that once, Ms. Schiavo had said that she wouldn't want to live "if
I ever have to be a burden to anybody."62 Michael Schiavo likewise
testified that Ms. Schiavo had stated in the past that she did not want her
life to be maintained "on anything artificial," would want "tubes and
everything taken out," and did not want to be sustained by "a machine."63
The Schindlers argued that Michael Schiavo was not a fit guardian and
could not be trusted to make such decisions on his wife's behalf. They
noted that he had been regularly dating other women since 1993, that he
failed to provide adequate care and attention to Ms. Schiavo, and that he
was wasting the guardianship account.' After a number of motions and
evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered that Ms. Schiavo's nutrition
and hydration be withdrawn on April 24, 2001.65
Schiavo I. The Schindler family appealed the trial court's decision to
the Second District Court of Appeal, arguing, among other things, that (1)
the trial court should have appointed a guardian ad litem for the
proceeding and (2) the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that, under these circumstances, Ms.
Schiavo would wish to discontinue life-sustaining nutrition and
hydration."
In analyzing the guardian ad litem issue, the district court noted that
Michael Schiavo "invoked the trial court's jurisdiction to allow the trial
court to serve as [Ms. Schiavo's] surrogate decision-maker."67 The court
concluded that the nature of the proceedings was such that a guardian ad
litem was not needed:
Under these circumstances, the two parties, as adversaries,
present their evidence to the trial court. The trial court
determines whether the evidence is sufficient to allow it to
make the decision for the ward to discontinue life support. In
this context, the trial court essentially serves as the ward's
guardian. Although we do not rule out the occasional need
for a guardian in this type of proceeding, a guardian ad litem
would tend to duplicate the function of the judge, would add
61. See, e.g., Petitioner's Motion for Stay at 14, Schiavo v. Schindler, 816 So. 2d 127
(2002) (unpublished table decision) (asking to stay the Second District Court of Appeal's order,
which mandated medical examination of Ms. Schiavo and required an evidentiary hearing).
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 14.
65. Id.
66. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178-79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
67. Id. at 178.
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little of value to this process, and might cause the process to
be influenced by hearsay or matters outside the record.68
The court next turned to the question of whether Michael Schiavo had
proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Schiavo would have
wished to discontinue nutrition and hydration under the present
circumstances. It framed the question in the following way:
[W]hether Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a few
weeks in a coma, but after ten years in a persistent vegetative
state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and all but
the most instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope
of a medical cure but with sufficient money and strength of
body to live indefinitely, would choose to continue the
constant nursing care and the supporting tubes in hopes that
a miracle would somehow recreate her missing brain tissue,
or whether she would wish to permit a natural death process
to take its course and for her family members and loved ones
to be free to continue their lives.69
The court noted that, under the laws of Florida, in making a decision
regarding the termination of life-sustaining measures, the surrogate
"'should err on the side of life.... In cases of doubt, we must assume that
a patient would choose to defend life in exercising his or her right of
privacy."' 7 The court noted that the hearsay statements regarding Ms.
Schiavo's wishes were "few and ...oral."'" Nevertheless, the court
concluded that such evidence, along with other evidence about Ms.
Schiavo, "gave the trial court a sufficient basis to make this decision for
her."72 Accordingly, the district court affirmed the trial court's decision.73
The Schindler family sought review of the district court decision in the
Florida Supreme Court, but review was denied on April 18, 2001.7 The
next day, Ms. Schiavo's nutrition and hydration tube was clamped.75
Schiavo II. Two days later, the Schindler family filed a motion for
relief from judgment, arguing that new evidence, including testimony from
a former girlfriend of Michael Schiavo, established that, contrary to
68. Id. at 179 (emphasis added). Note that in Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551,557 (Fla.
2d DCA 2001), the court acknowledged that "Mr. Schiavo, as guardian, requested the court to
function as the proxy in light of the dissension within the family."
69. Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 180 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 179 (quoting Herbert v. State, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)).
71. Id. at 180.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Schindler v. Schiavo, 789 So. 2d 348, 348 (Fla. 2001).
75. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 15.
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Michael Schiavo's testimony at trial, he and Ms. Schiavo never discussed
what her wishes would have been under the present circumstances. 76 The
trial court denied the motion as untimely because it was filed beyond the
one-year limitations provision specified by the relevant rule of procedure.77
Immediately thereafter, the Schindlers filed a civil complaint as "natural
guardians" for their daughter, alleging that the newly discovered witness
(Michael Schiavo's former girlfriend) would prove that Michael Schiavo
had perjured himself by testifying as to Ms. Schiavo's intentions regarding
her own care under these circumstances, and that the trial court had relied
on this perjured testimony in reaching its conclusion to terminate Ms.
Schiavo's nutrition and hydration.78 In connection with this complaint, the
Schindlers moved for a temporary injunction of the trial court's order.79
The trial court granted the motion, and nutrition and hydration were
restored to Ms. Schiavo.8 ° In response, Michael Schiavo filed an
emergency motion with the district court to enforce the trial court's
original order to discontinue nutrition and hydration.8
On consolidated appeal, the district court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the Schindler family's motion for relief had been untimely,
but noted that on remand, the Schindlers would be permitted to file a
revised motion for relief under a separate rule of procedure82 if they could
plead and prove newly discovered evidence of such a
substantial nature that it proves either (1) that Mrs. Schiavo
would not have made the decision to withdraw life-
prolonging procedures fourteen months earlier when the final
order was entered, or (2) that Mrs. Schiavo would make a
different decision at this time based on developments
subsequent to the earlier court order.83
The court directed the trial court to refrain from enforcing its original
order until the Schindlers had an opportunity to file a proper motion for
relief, as described above.84
In the course of its analysis, the district court shed a great deal of light
on the nature of the court's order to withdraw nutrition and hydration from
Ms. Schiavo. The court explained:
76. Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
77. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(2), (3)).
78. Id. at 555-56.
79. Id. at 556.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1540(b)(5).
83. Schindler, 792 So. 2d at 554.
84. Id.
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The order requiring the termination of life-prolonging
procedures is not a standard legal judgment, but an order in
the nature of a mandatory injunction compelling certain
actions by the guardian and, indirectly, by the health care
providers. Until the life-prolonging procedures are
discontinued, such an order is entirely executory, and the
ward and guardian continue to be under the jurisdiction and
supervision of the guardianship court. As long as the ward is
alive, the order is subject to recall and is executory in
nature. 85
The court also noted that the trial court's order was compulsory; it did not
merely vest discretion in the guardian to discontinue life support: "The
guardian was obligated to obey the circuit court's decision and discontinue
the treatment.
86
The court partially dismissed the Schindler family's separate civil
action against Michael Schiavo, and it reversed the related temporary
injunction.87 The concerns of the Schindlers, the court reasoned, were best
addressed in the context of the pending guardianship matter.8 The court
likewise denied Michael Schiavo's motion to enforce the trial court's order
withdrawing nutrition and hydration.89 In so doing, the district court noted
that the trial court should have the discretion to manage its original order,
especially in light of the fact that the Schindlers had standing to file a
motion for relief, as described above.9"
Schiavo II. Following the district court's instruction in Schiavo II, the
Schindler family filed an amended motion for relief from the trial court's
order withdrawing nutrition and hydration from their daughter.9 The
Schindlers also filed a "Petition for Independent Medical Examination,"
a petition for removal of guardian, and a motion to disqualify the original
trial judge (Judge Greer).92 The trial court summarily dismissed all of these
motions.93
The Second District Court of Appeal, without discussion, affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of the Schindler family's motion for removal of
85. Id. at 558-59 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 559 n.5.
87. Id. at 562-63.
88. Id. at 563.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Schindler v. Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
92. Id. at 643.
93. Id.
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Michael Schiavo as guardian and for removal of Judge Greer.94 It more
fully treated the Schindler family's remaining claims.
In their amended motion for relief, the Schindlers argued that it was no
longer equitable to give effect to the trial court's original order to
withdraw nutrition and hydration from their daughter for two reasons: (1)
evidence from three new witnesses (two close female associates of
Michael Schiavo and the husband of one of these women) challenging the
trial court's conclusion that Ms. Schiavo would have wanted nutrition and
hydration withdrawn under these circumstances;95 and (2) evidence,
including numerous affidavits of experts, that their daughter was not in a
persistent vegetative state, and that current accepted medical treatment
existed that could restore her ability to eat and speak.96 The district court
rejected the first argument, affirming the trial court's conclusion that the
new evidence of Ms. Schiavo's intentions "failed to present a colorable
claim for entitlement to relief from the judgment."97
As for the Schindler family's second basis, the district court concluded
that it was improper for the trial court to summarily dismiss the claim
absent an evidentiary hearing, in light of the sworn testimony that Ms.
Schindler might benefit from further medical treatment.98 The court
concluded that, because the Schindlers presented new evidence on this
point, and because the court must in these circumstances "assume that a
patient would choose to defend life in exercising the right of privacy," the
trial court should have concluded that there was a colorable entitlement to
relief sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.99 The appellate court thus
directed the trial court on remand to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the new evidence was sufficient to establish that "the current final
judgment [was] no longer equitable."'" On remand, the Schindlers were
to bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
"new treatment offers sufficient promise of increased cognitive function
in Mrs. Schiavo's cerebral cortex-significantly improving the quality of
Mrs. Schiavo's life-so that she herself would elect to undergo this
treatment and would reverse the prior decision to withdraw life-prolonging
procedures."''
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 643-44. One expert, an osteopathic physician, swore under oath that Ms. Schiavo
had "a good opportunity to show some degree of improvement if treated" with his prescribed
therapy. Id. at 644.
97. Id. at 643.
98. Id. at 644-45.
99. Id. at 645.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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The district court treated the Schindler family's request for an
independent examination as a request for discovery within the proceeding
before the guardianship court. °2 It directed the trial court to permit this to
go forward, subject to several limitations. 1°3 The district court ordered the
trial court to permit the Schindlers to choose two doctors to present their
views at an evidentiary hearing.'°4 The court further ordered the trial court
to permit Michael Schiavo to offer his own two experts for rebuttal
purposes.0 5 Finally, the appellate court directed the trial court to appoint
a new independent physician to examine and evaluate Ms. Schiavo's
present condition.0 6 The district court urged the parties to come together
to agree on an independent, board-certified neurologist or neurosurgeon. "'
In the event that there was no agreement on this point, the court directed
the trial court to appoint this expert.'08 The district court concluded that the
five experts should each file a report, to be presented at the evidentiary
hearing before the trial court.0 9 The district court noted that the purpose
of the evidentiary hearing was to determine
Mrs. Schiavo's current medical condition, the nature of the
new medical treatments described in the affidavits and their
acceptance in the relevant scientific community, the probable
efficacy of these new treatments, and any other factor that the
trial court itself determines to be necessary for it to decide
whether this evidence calls into question the initial
judgment."0
Schiavo IV. On remand, the Schindlers and Michael Schiavo presented
evidence to the trial court (as the district court had prescribed in Schiavo
III) in an effort to determine if "new treatment exist[ed] which offer[ed]
such promise of increased cognitive function in Mrs. Schiavo's cerebral
cortex that she herself would elect to undergo this treatment and would
reverse the prior decision to withdraw life-prolonging procedures. '" The
Schindlers tendered testimony from a board-certified neurologist and a
board-certified expert in radiology and nuclear medicine." 2 Michael
102. Id. at 646.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 647.
111. Schindler v. Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
112. Id. at 184.
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Schiavo submitted testimony from two board-certified neurologists. 3 The
parties could not agree on the selection of the fifth expert, so the trial court
selected an additional neurologist." 4 Each physician reviewed Ms.
Schiavo's medical records, including brain scans, and conducted a
neurological examination." 5 This evidence, along with videotapes of Ms.
Schiavo, was presented to the trial court and subject to cross-
examination."' The neurologist selected by the Schindlers testified that
"vasodilation therapy and hyperbaric therapy 'could help [Ms. Schiavo]
improve.""'1 7 He did not, however, testify that any "specific function"
would improve, nor did he claim that it would "restore her cognitive
ftunctions." " The therapies he advocated aimed at increasing blood flow
and oxygen to damaged brain tissue, but the therapies could not regenerate
dead tissue." 9 The experts retained by the parties disagreed as to "whether
[Ms. Schiavo] ha[d] a small amount of isolated living tissue in her cerebral
cortex or whether she ha[d] no living tissue in her cerebral cortex."' 2 °
However, the evidentiary hearing focused principally on another issue,
namely, whether Ms. Schiavo was indeed in a "persistent vegetative
state."'' On this point the experts vigorously disagreed. The experts for
the Schindlers were persuaded that Ms. Schiavo was not in a persistent
vegetative state based on her actions and responses to physical and verbal
contact with her mother.' The physicians retained by Michael Schiavo
and the physician appointed by the court disagreed.'23 The trial court was
persuaded by this latter testimony and held specifically that "Mrs. Schiavo
remained in a permanent vegetative state."'24 The court further concluded
that the Schindlers had failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that there was "a treatment in existence that offered such promise of
increased cognitive function in Mrs. Schiavo's cerebral cortex that she
herself would elect to undergo it at this time."' 25 Accordingly, the trial
court denied the Schindler family's motion for relief from the original
judgment, and it rescheduled the removal of hydration and nutrition for
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 184-85.
116. Id. at185.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Ms. Schiavo. 126 The Schindlers immediately appealed. 127. The trial court
then stayed its own order, pending the decision of the district court. 28
The Second District Court of Appeal noted at the outset that its review
was limited to the denial of the motion for relief of judgment; the court
was not reviewing the original final judgment itself.'29 The court pointed
out that the standard of review in this context is very deferential; some
authorities go as far as to suggest that the trial court's decision may not be
reversed "absent a showing of a gross abuse of discretion." 3 ' The court
rejected requests by the Schindlers to conduct a de novo review of the trial
court's judgment.' 3' Nevertheless, the court stated that it had, in fact,
carefully reviewed the evidence presented below, and if it were to conduct
a de novo review, it would still affirm the lower court's decision.
3 2
In affirming the trial court's conclusion, the district court elaborated on
what it considered to be the heart of the dispute:
[I]n the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving
parents have for their children. It is about Theresa Schiavo's
right to make her own decision, independent of her parents
and independent of her husband. In circumstances such as
these, when families cannot agree, the law has opened the
doors of the circuit courts to permit trial judges to serve as
surrogates or proxies to make decisions about life-prolonging
procedures. It is the trial judge's duty not to make the
decision that the judge would make for himself or herself or
for a loved one. Instead, the trial judge must make a decision
that the clear and convincing evidence shows the ward would
have made for herself.... It may be unfortunate that when
families cannot agree, the best forum we can offer for this
private, personal decision is a public courtroom and the best
decision-maker we can provide is a judge with no prior
knowledge of the ward, but the law currently provides no
better solution that adequately protects the interests of
promoting the value of life.'33
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 185-86.
130. Id. at 186 (citing various district court decisions).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 186-87 (citations omitted). This reflection on the nature and substance of the
process for guardianship decisions is enormously important and is discussed at length below.
[Vol. 57
TERRI S LAW
Following the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, the trial
court set October 15, 2003 as the date for termination of nutrition and
hydration for Ms. Schiavo.1
34
D. Legislative and Executive Response
On October 15, 2003, Ms. Schiavo's nutrition and hydration tube was
disconnected. 135 She was expected to die of starvation and dehydration
within seven to fourteen days.136 However, Governor Jeb Bush convened
a special session of the state legislature for the purpose of considering a
possible statutory response to the circumstances of Ms. Schiavo and other
patients like her. 37 The Florida Constitution requires that new "legislative
business" transacted at a special session be introduced if both houses of the
legislature consent or if the business is within the purview of the
Governor's proclamation or communication.
38
On October 21, 2003, the state legislature passed "Terri's Law."'139 The
law authorizes the Governor to
issue a one-time stay to prevent the withholding of nutrition
and hydration from a patient if, as of October 15, 2003:
(a) That patient has no written advance directive;
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent
vegetative state;
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and
(d) A member of that patient's family has challenged the
withholding of nutrition and hydration. 4
Under the law, the Governor may lift the stay at any time. " Moreover, the
law immunizes from civil liability and regulatory or disciplinary sanctions
anyone taking action to comply with it."'2 Upon the issuance of a stay, the
chief judge of the relevant circuit court would be directed to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to the
134. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 17.
135. Id. at 18.
136. See, e.g., Vickie Chachere, Judge Orders Feeding Stopped, BRADENTON HERALD, Sept.
18, 2003, Local section, at 5.
137. See generally Woman's Fate May Be Left to Bush: House Votes to Give Governor a Say
in Brain-Damaged Patient's Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2003, at A 1.
138. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(cX1).
139. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
Governor and the court.'43 The law included a sunset provision, providing
for its expiration fifteen days following the date of its enactment.144
Immediately following the law's enactment, Governor Bush, pursuant
to his new authority, intervened in the Schiavo matter, ordering a stay of
the trial court's order. 45 Nutrition and hydration were restored to Ms.
Schiavo.'46 Thereafter, a guardian ad litem, Dr. Jay Wolfson, was
appointed for Ms. Schiavo.'47 On December 1, 2003, he filed a 38-page
report, describing the facts of the Schiavo matter and recommending that
the Governor should lift or maintain the stay depending on whether "valid,
independent scientific medical evidence clearly indicate[d] that [Ms.
Schiavo] ha[d] a reasonable medical hope of regaining any swallowing
function and/or if there [was] evidence of cognitive function with or
without hope of improvement.' ' 14 8 Dr. Wolfson also concluded that there
was "feasibility and value in swallowing tests and swallowing therapy
being administered if the parties agree[d] in advance as to how the results
of these tests [would] be used."' 49 Dr. Wolfson concluded that the weight
of the medical evidence suggested that Ms. Schiavo was "in a persistent
vegetative state with no likelihood of improvement," supporting the claims
that "she [could not] take oral nutrition or hydration and [could not]
consciously interact with her environment."' 5 ° Curiously, however, Dr.
Wolfson included the following footnote regarding the evidence of Ms.
Schiavo's condition:
But that is not enough. This evidence is compromised by
the circumstances and the enmity between the parties.
Until and unless there is objective, fresh, mutually agreed
upon closure regarding measurable and well-accepted
scientific bases for deducing Theresa's clinical state, Theresa
will not be done justice. There must be at least a degree of
trust with respect to a process that the factions competing for
Theresa's best interest can agree. To benefit Theresa, and in
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Wolfson, supra note 1, at 18.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 33.
149. Id
150. Id.
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the overall interests of justice, good science, and public
policy, there needs to be a fresh, clean-hands start.151
Regarding the litigation, Dr. Wolfson concluded that "the trier of fact and
the evidence that served as the basis for the decisions regarding Theresa
Schiavo were firmly grounded within Florida statutory and case law." '152
Finally, Dr. Wolfson recommended that his appointment be extended until
the matter was resolved.'53 Following the issuance of the report, Dr.
Wolfson was dismissed from service as guardian ad litem by the court.'54
Michael Schiavo has filed suit, claiming that "Terri's Law" is
unconstitutional both facially and as applied to Ms. Schiavo.'55 He has
argued, among other things, that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers provided by the Florida and United States Constitutions. 5 6 This
lawsuit is ongoing.'57
1I. RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITIES
Because this Article seeks to explore whether Terri's Law respects
separation of powers principles, it is necessary to briefly set forth, in a
general way, the legal authorities most relevant to this question. To this
end, the sections below include an overview of the right to refuse medical
treatment, the governance of end-of-life decisions, and the doctrine of the
separation of powers. While federal constitutional law informs all of these
accounts, for obvious reasons, the discussion that follows focuses on
Florida law. Florida law on these questions closely tracks its federal
analogue; to the extent that it departs from federal constitutional law, this
is noted.
A. Refusal of Unwanted Medical Treatment
The Supreme Courts of the United States and Florida have both
acknowledged that a competent person has a right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.'58 The Florida Supreme Court has further recognized
151. Id. at 33 n.l.
152. Id. at 34.
153. Id.
154. Order Discharging the Guardian ad Litem, Schindler v. Schiavo, No. 90-002908-GD-03
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2003).
155. See Schiavo v. Bush, No. 03-008212CI-20, 2004 WL 980028 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 5,2004).
156. Id.
157. Shortly before this article went to the press, the Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion
passing on the constitutionality of Terri's Law. See infra Part V for a brief discussion.
158. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 & n.7 (1990) (locating this
interest in the "liberty clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment and explicitly rejecting the view that
the right to refuse treatment is grounded in a generalized constitutional right of privacy); State v.
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this right regardless of the nature of the medical procedure in question, be
it "ordinary or extraordinary, life-prolonging, life-maintaining, life-
sustaining, or otherwise."' Moreover, this right is not lost due to
incapacity or incompetence; an individual in a non-cognitive condition and
thus unable to express herself is nevertheless entitled to have her wishes
regarding medical treatment respected. 6 ° In cases involving living wills
or advance directives, discerning such wishes may prove to be a relatively
straightforward matter. In cases where there is no prior written declaration
by the patient regarding her wishes, however, things are much more
complicated and fraught with possible risks. Florida permits surrogate or
proxy decisionmakers to exercise the choice that the incompetent patient
would have made, given the circumstances, subject to procedures
discussed below.'
6
'
States have the duty to ensure that an individual's wishes regarding
acceptance or refusal of medical treatment are observed. 62 Accordingly,
states may erect certain procedural safeguards to prevent abuse and to
guarantee that the individual's preferences are truly being implemented.
For example, in Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court held that "a
State may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in proceedings
where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person
diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state." '63 Florida has adopted this
evidentiary standard for such circumstances. 64
There are rare instances in which a state's interest is held to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh an individual patient's clearly
expressed desires to refuse medical treatmentm' 65 Such compelling interests
can include "state interests in the preservation of life, the protection of
innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession."' 66 To overcome a patient's
clearly stated intentions in these circumstances, the state's actions in
Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990) (grounding the interest in the "right of privacy" provided by
the state constitution) (courts and commentators often refer to this case as In re Guardianship of
Browning).
159. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 11 n.6.
160. Id. at 12.
16 1. See id. at 13. It bears noting, however, that in Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court
made clear that due process does not require "the State to repose judgment on these matters with
anyone but the patient herself." 497 U.S. at 286.
162. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 13.
163. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284.
164. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 15.
165. Id. at 13-14.
166. Id. at 14.
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pursuit of this compelling interest must be both narrowly tailored and the
least intrusive means available.'67
In sum, patients, whether competent or incompetent, have the right to
refuse medical treatment. Various states, including Florida, ensure the
reliability of this process by adopting high evidentiary standards, such as
"clear and convincing," and impose the burden of proof on the party
seeking to discontinue life-sustaining measures.
B. Regulation of End-of-Life Decisionmaking
In 1992, shortly after the Florida Supreme Court's Herbert decision,
the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 765,168 a fairly comprehensive
legal regime, to regulate the domain of end-of-life decisionmaking.169 The
chief animating principle of Florida's guardianship scheme is to discern
and vindicate the intentions of the patient. 70 Accordingly, the wishes of
the patient, if they can be identified, are paramount. If the intentions of the
patient cannot be discerned, a decision will be made that reflects her "best
interest[s]" under the circumstances. 171 If there is ambiguity, the court
must presume that the patient would have chosen "to defend life in
exercising his or her right of privacy.'
172
Part IV of Chapter 765, "Absence of Advance Directive," governs
circumstances, like those of Schiavo, in which there is no prior written
declaration of intention regarding end-of-life care. 173 For those cases,
Florida has adopted a "substituted judgment" standard: a third party is
empowered to carry out the patient's wishes, to the extent that the
decisions are supported by evidence that this is what the patient would
have chosen if competent. 74 In this way, Part IV adopts the reasoning
provided by the court in Herbert:
[I]t is important for the surrogate decisionmaker to fully
appreciate that he or she makes the decision which the patient
would personally choose. In this state, we have adopted a
concept of "substituted judgment." One does not exercise
another's right of self-determination or fulfill that person's
right of privacy by making a decision which the state, the
167. Id.
168. 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 199.
169. See FLA. STAT. § 765.101-546 (2003).
170. Id. § 765.401(3).
171. Id.
172. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 200 1) (quoting Herbert v. State,
543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)).
173. See §§ 765.401-404.
174. See, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So. 2d 118,121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
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family, or public opinion would prefer. The surrogate
decisionmaker must be confident that he or she can and is
voicing the patient's decision.
1 75
In cases such as Ms. Schiavo's, where the now-incompetent patient has
not previously designated a third-party decisionmaker, Part IV of Chapter
765 provides for health care "proxies" to act on her behalf, subject to
certain procedural limitations. 7 6 The statute supplies a list of persons who
may serve as proxies in this context. 7 7 Proxies may, under the appropriate
circumstances, authorize the decision to withdraw "life-prolonging
procedures,"'' 7' defined as "any medical procedure, treatment, or
intervention, including artificially provided sustenance and hydration,
which sustains, restores, or supplants a spontaneous vital function."'
' 79
Prior to authorizing termination of life-prolonging procedures, two
physicians must document"'8 that the "patient does not have a reasonable
medical probability of regaining capacity," the "patient has an end-stage
condition," the "patient's physical condition is terminal," or as is alleged
in Ms. Schiavo's case, the "patient is in a persistent vegetative state"
(PVS).'8 PVS is defined as "a permanent and irreversible condition of
unconsciousness in which there is... [an] absence of voluntary action or
cognitive behavior of any kind."' 82 A proxy may authorize termination of
life-prolonging procedures only ifthe decision is "supported by clear and
convincing evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient
would have chosen had the patient been competent, or, if there is no
indication of what the patient would have chosen, that the decision is in the
patient's best interest."'' 83
In situations where a patient lacking an advance directive is in a PVS
and "for whom, after a reasonably diligent inquiry, no family or friends are
available or willing to serve as a proxy," life-sustaining measures may be
discontinued only if.
(1) The person has a judicially appointed guardian
representing his or her best interest with authority to consent
to medical treatment; and
175. State v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Herbert, 543 So. 2d at 269)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
176. § 765.401.
177. Id.
178. § 765.401(2).
179. § 765.101(10).
180. Id. § 765.401(1)(h).
181. Id. § 765.305.
182. Id. § 765.101(12).
183. Id. § 765.401(3).
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(2) The guardian and the person's attending physician, in
consultation with the medical ethics committee of the facility
where the patient is located, conclude that the condition is
permanent and that there is no reasonable medical
probability for recovery and that withholding or withdrawing
life-prolonging procedures is in the best interest of the
patient. '84
The Florida Guardianship Law, Chapter 744, explicitly states that "[n]o
judge shall act as guardian after this law becomes effective."' 85
All decisions made pursuant to Chapter 765 of the Florida Statutes
governing end-of-life decisions are subject to expedited judicial review.'18 6
Bases for review include claims that the treatment decision is contrary to
the patient's known desires or to the provisions of Chapter 765; the proxy
has failed to or is unable to discharge his duties; the proxy has abused his
powers; or the patient has sufficient capacity to make her own health
decisions. 8 7 A court's order to withdraw life-prolonging procedures, "in
the nature of a mandatory injunction," is strictly executory in nature. 188
That is, until the death of the patient in question, the court retains
jurisdiction over the patient and her guardian, and the order is subject to
revision. 189
In sum, the principal goal of Florida's statutory scheme governing end-
of-life decisionmaking is to identify and vindicate the wishes of the patient
regarding her treatment, while avoiding abuse and exploitation of
vulnerable individuals. Thus, Florida requires that any third party decision
to terminate life-prolonging procedures be supported by clear and
convincing evidence that the decision is what the patient herself would
have chosen under the circumstances. To further safeguard the interests of
patients with no living will or advance directive, Florida additionally
requires a showing that the patient is suffering from a persistent vegetative
state, with no reasonable probability of regaining capacity. If these very
high evidentiary standards cannot be satisfied, the proxy must choose
treatment options according to the patient's best interests. In circumstances
where a friend or family member cannot serve as a proxy decisionmaker,
Florida law requires the appointment of a guardian to represent the
patient's best interests. Florida law expressly states that judges may not
serve as guardians in this context. As a final measure against potential
184. Id. § 765.404 (emphasis added).
185. Id. § 744.309(1)(b).
186. Id. § 765.105.
187. Id.
188. Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
189. Id.
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abuse, in the face of ambiguity, the courts are to presume that the patient
would have desired to continue life-sustaining measures.
C. Separation of Powers
The United States and Florida Constitutions each establish a tripartite
system of government, in which the branches--executive, legislative, and
judicial-are separate and distinct. The Florida Constitution explicitly
provides: "The powers of the state government shall be divided into
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein."'90 This principle of separation
of powers is animated chiefly by the concern "that the fusion of the powers
of any two branches into the same department would ultimately result in
the destruction of liberty."'' Thus, the purpose and goal of the doctrine of
separation of powers is to safeguard the freedom of citizens and to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive acts by those with governmental authority.
For the present inquiry, it is worth briefly reflecting on which powers
are uniquely reposed in the various branches under Florida law, both
generally and in the context of end-of-life decisionmaking. Unlike the
United States Congress, which can act only pursuant to those powers
enumerated by the Constitution,'92 the Florida Legislature is vested with
the plenary authority to enact laws, subject only to limitation by the state
constitution.'93 Such laws are to apply prospectively and must be of
general and uniform application."9 The legislative branch bears the
responsibility to protect the rights of citizens,' and it has the exclusive
obligation to enact social policy. 196 Most importantly for present purposes,
the legislature defines and administers the regulation of end-of-life
decisions.' 97 The judicial department, by contrast, enjoys the exclusive
power to "administer justice and resolve disputes within the common law
and the laws established by the legislature."' 98 As the United States
190. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
191. Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1991) (citing Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23,
42-43 (Fla. 1851); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison)),
192. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,607 (2000) ("Every law enacted
by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.");
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
193. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1; Bd. ofPub. Instruction v. Wright, 76 So. 2d 863,864 (Fla. 1955)
(en banc).
194. Ponder, 4 Fla. at 34-35.
195. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 361 (Fla. 1980).
196. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 104 (Fla. 1997).
197. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.101-546 (2003).
198. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
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Supreme Court stated in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,'99 the judicial
branch has the power to render a judgment that "'conclusively resolves the
case' because 'a "judicial Power" is one to render dispositive
judgments."' 2 In the end-of-life context, the courts in Florida exercise a
supervisory role, emerging both from the equitable powers of chancery '
and from positive designation by the relevant Florida statutes.20 2 Because
the end to be served by the judicial role in such matters is not finality but
rather the proper administration of the person and her estate, the courts
retain jurisdiction until the death of the ward. Finally, the executive branch
has the sole responsibility and power to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed."2 3 The Governor is charged by statute with the
authority to "procure and secure protection to life, liberty, and property of
the inhabitants of the state."2" In certain matters affecting vulnerable
individuals, such as the mentally ill or otherwise incompetent, the
executive branch is empowered to intervene to safeguard their interests.
20 5
There are essentially two ways in which the principle of separation of
powers can be violated: (1) if one branch encroaches upon or nullifies the
powers of another; or (2) if one branch improperly delegates its own, or
another branch's, constitutionally-assigned authority to a separate branch
of government. °6 Most relevant to the present inquiry are those violations
in which another branch of government seeks to nullify a pronouncement
of the judicial department, or in which the legislature delegates its
authority in a constitutionally improper fashion. Each will be taken
separately.
Courts both in Florida and in the federal system "'possess the entire
body of judicial power' and are not to be "'hampered or limited in the
discharge of their functions by either of the other two branches.'
207
Respect for separation of powers in this context necessarily requires that
final judgments of courts not be subject to review or interference by the
other branches of government. The insulation of the judicial branch from
such encroachment "serves both to protect 'the role of the independent
199. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
200. Id. at 219 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
905,926 (1990)).
201. Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
202. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 744.1085 (2003) (assigning delegation and determination of
guardianship to courts).
203. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
204. FLA. STAT. § 14.01 (2003).
205. § 415.1051 (empowering the Florida Department of Children and Families to intervene
unilaterally under certain circumstances to defend the interests of a vulnerable adult at risk of death
or serious injury).
206. Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991).
207. 16 Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 259 (2004).
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judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government' and to
safeguard litigants' 'rights to have claims decided before judges who are
free from potential domination by other branches of government.' 2 8 It
follows, therefore, that the executive branch has no authority, nor can it be
given authority, to review or oversee judicial decisions.219 Similarly, the
legislature cannot reverse, nullify, or overturn a court's final judgment
through legislative enactment. In Plaut, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, traced the historical and philosophical underpinnings of this
doctrine, arguing by reference to Federalist Numbers 81 and 78, and
concluded: "Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision
becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular
case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive
legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other
than what the courts said it was."2 ' In his account, Scalia makes clear the
distinction between the unique and exclusive roles of the legislature and
the judiciary. The role of the judicial department is to interpret and apply
the law relevant to a given case at a given time.2 1' In this sense, final
judgments are always backwards looking. By contrast, legislation is, with
a few well-defined exceptions, always prospective.1 2 It is the role of the
legislature to say what the law will be. Lawmakers are thus free to alter the
future effect of laws that they deem to be ill-advised through the formal
legislative process. In this way, legislation can affect the outcome of
matters before the courts that are not yet final. Final judgments, however,
are fixed and beyond the reach of legislation.
Separation of powers principles are also offended when a branch of
government delegates its own, or another's, exclusively held authority to
another branch z.2 3 The legislature cannot, for example, delegate powers
exclusively reposed in the judicial department to the executive branch.2"4
To determine whether a given power is exclusive to one branch, one must
consider the constitutional text and history, along with the nature of the
activity in question.25 If the authority in question is not exclusive to one
branch, the delegation of the authority is not unconstitutional.2 16
208. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citation
omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985); United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
209. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 213 So. 2d 716, 720 (Fla. 1968) (per curiam).
210. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,227 (1995).
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991).
214. Canney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1973).
215. Simms v. State, 641 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
216. Id. at 960.
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The legislature is constitutionally prohibited from assigning its own
exclusively held power to other branches through excessive delegation.27
To be sure, legislatures may, and routinely do, delegate authority to the
executive branch to administer a statutory scheme; in so doing they
oftentimes provide to the relevant agency a measure of discretion to flesh
out the underlying law's contours.2 18 To pass constitutional muster,
however, such authority may not be utterly open-ended and must provide
" some minimal standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to the
[underlying] enactment.""2 9 In short, the executive official must be given
guidance as to the intention of the act itself, so as not to cede the
"discretion as to What the law shall be," 220 which, of course, is the
province of the legislature alone.
IV. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS
Having set forth the underlying factual predicates and provided a
broad-stroke outline of the relevant legal authorities, the ground is
sufficiently prepared to turn directly to the two questions at the heart of the
inquiry: Does Terri's Law violate the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers? If not, is it wise public policy, in light of the values and logic
that animate Florida's laws governing end-of-life decisionmaking?
A. Does Terri's Law Violate Separation of Powers?
There are three possible arguments that the Florida legislature ran afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers in enacting Terri's Law: (1) the
legislature improperly delegated its lawmaking authority to the Governor
by failing to provide adequate guidelines and standards for the
administration of the underlying act; (2) the legislature delegated authority
to the Governor that is exclusively judicial in nature; and (3) the
legislature effectively nullified the action of the judiciary by empowering
the Governor to overturn its order directing the removal of Ms. Schiavo's
nasogastric tube. Each will be taken in turn, with greatest attention given
to the third, as it seems to be the most complicated and the most interesting
challenge to the legislature's actions in the Schiavo matter.
1. Delegation of Standardless Legislative Authority?
Did the legislature leave the Governor with no standards or intelligible
principle as to how to administer the law in question? Did it, in effect,
217. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19 (Fia. 1978).
218. See id. at 924.
219. Id. at925.
220. Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1968).
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empower the Governor to be "the law maker" rather than its administrator?
It seems not. First, the Governor's discretion is limited dramatically by the
prerequisite conditions that must obtain before he can act pursuant to the
statute; the Governor can intervene only in very narrowly-defined
circumstances. As stated above, Terri's Law authorizes the Governor to
stay a court-ordered withdrawal of life-preserving procedures and appoint
a guardian ad litem for the patient when: (1) the patient has no written
advance directive; (2) the court has found the patient to be in a persistent
vegetative state; (3) the patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld;
and (4) a member of the patient's family has challenged the withholding
of nutrition and hydration.22' Moreover, the clear intention of the law is to
augment the already extant statutory framework regulating end-of-life
decisions by allowing for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, under
narrowly prescribed circumstances, to make recommendations to the
Governor and to the relevant court.222 The goals of Terri's Law and the
current law governing this matter are coextensive: to discern and vindicate
the wishes of the now-incompetent patient; failing that, to act in her best
interests; and to avoid irreversible abuse or error. The fact that the
Governor has a measure of flexibility in invoking his authority under
Terri's Law does not seem to be fatal; there is ample precedent for
allowing an executive official some discretion in administering otherwise
narrowly drawn statutes.223 Indeed, "[t]he legislature may enact a law
complete in itself, which leaves some discretion in the operation and
enforcement of the law with an administrative official." '24
2. Delegation to the Executive of Exclusively Judicial Authority?
Does Terri's Law vest in the Governor powers that are exclusively
reposed in the judicial branch? To answer this question, one must
"consider the essential nature and effect of the governmental activity to be
performed. ' '2 5 The domain in question is the regulation of end-of-life
decisionmaking and guardianship. Under Terri's Law, the Governor has
the authority, under narrow circumstances, to stay a court-ordered
221. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 2,5 (Fla. 1962) (upholding an
act authorizing an agency to act "so that the welfare and health of patients and the best interests of
the hospital may at all times be best served"); E.M. Watkins & Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 414 So. 2d
583, 588-89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding that "good cause" is not too ambiguous a standard to
satisfy nondelegation doctrine concerns); Albrecht v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 353 So. 2d 883
(Fla. 1stDCA 1977) (upholding the authority ofan agencyto determine whether a proposed project
will be "contrary to public interest").
224. E.M Watkins & Co., 414 So. 2d at 588.
225. Simms v. State, 641 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
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withdrawal of nutrition and hydration and appoint a guardian ad litem.226
In Florida, guardianship and end-of-life decisionmaking are not
exclusively governed by the courts. The judiciary certainly has a role in
this area, by virtue of the equitable powers of chancery and by statutory
delegation. However, this area is principally, though not exclusively,
governed by the legislature. As discussed above, it has enacted a fairly
robust and comprehensive regulatory framework, providing guidance for
surrogate and proxy decisionmaking in this context, with high evidentiary
standards and procedures . 2 7 Nothing indicates that the authority over end-
of-life decisionmaking "is an exclusive and pure power which the
Constitution requires to be confined to a single branch of government.
228
Subject to appropriate standards, the legislature is free to delegate to other
branches, as it already has done, in its effort to administer its regulation of
the end-of-life context. In short, there is nothing intrinsically judicial in
nature about the guardianship or end-of-life domain. Accordingly, it does
not offend separation of powers principles to delegate some authority to
the executive branch to govern in this area.
Are separation of powers principles offended by virtue of the simple
fact that it was the Governor who stayed the court's order directing the
withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's nasogastric tube? Executive interventions
following judicial pronouncements are not unprecedented. Pursuant to the
Governor's constitutionally based clemency authority, he can "grant full
or conditional pardons, restore civil rights, commute punishment, and
remit fines and forfeitures for offenses. 229 Similarly, by legislative
enactment, the Governor has the authority to stay executions of those
convicted and sentenced to death.230 Indeed, the Supreme Court of the
United States has upheld a statute deeming Georgia's Governor "an 'apt
and special tribunal' to pass on questions of the sanity of convicted
prisoners sentenced to death.23' Thus, executive intervention following a
judicial decision does not, per se, violate separation of powers. But this
does not settle the matter; in fact, it may be the wrong question. The
inquiry, rather, should focus on the constitutionality of the underlying
authority itself-namely, Terri's Law. The question should be formulated
as follows: Did the legislature, in enacting Terri's Law, impermissibly and
226. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 109-24.
228. Simms, 641 So. 2d at 961 (discussing the authority to protect children and terminate
parental rights).
229. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
230. FLA. STAT. § 922.06 (2003).
231. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S; 9, 12 (1950) (quoting Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398,
409 (1897)).
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unconstitutionally nullify, overturn, or reverse the actions of the judicial
branch?
3. Does Terri's Law Unconstitutionally Nullify an Action of the
Judicial Branch?
It is inarguable that by enacting Terri's Law, the Florida legislature
effectively overturned the Florida court's order directing the withdrawal
of nutrition and hydration from Ms. Schiavo. This seems to be the
paradigm example of nullification of one branch's actions by another that
strikes at the heart of separation of powers. It turns out, however, that the
constitutionality of this action is quite a complicated question.
It is certainly true that the legislature cannot use its lawmaking function
to simply overturn the final judgment of a court.232 There was no
ambiguity in Justice Scalia's pronouncement in Plaut that "[h]aving
achieved finality, . . . a judicial decision becomes the last word of the
judicial department" that may not be disturbed by retroactive legislation.233
Justice Scalia was careful to point out, however, that this holding did not
disturb the doctrine, articulated 140 years earlier in Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,234 that the legislature does have the
authority to alter the prospective effect of previously entered executory
judgments authorizing injunctive relief.235 The Wheeling Bridge doctrine
was revisited five years after the Plaut decision in Miller v. French,236 a
case that has important implications for the Schiavo matter and the
propriety of the Florida legislature's actions in that context.
In Miller v. French, the Court addressed a challenge to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.237 Among other things, the Act
"establishe[d] standards for the entry and termination of prospective relief
in civil actions challenging conditions at prison facilities." '238 The Act's
strictures applied not only prospectively to injunctions that might be issued
in the future, but also retrospectively to those injunctions already in effect
from executory judgments in prior cases."' The Act provided a
mechanism for defendants or intervenors to move to terminate these prior
executory judgments.240 Moreover, a separate section of the Act provided
that a motion for termination should "operate as [an automatic] stay" of
232. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995).
233. Id.
234. 59 U.S. 421 (1856).
235. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232.
236. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
237. Id. at 331.
238. Id. at 333.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).
240. Id. § 3626(b)(2).
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the court's previously issued injunctive relief, beginning thirty days after
the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion.24" ' The
prisoners challenged this provision on the grounds that it violated the
principles of Plaut, namely that the legislature was barred by the doctrine
of separation of powers from overturning previously entered judgments
through retroactive legislation.242 The Court reaffirmed that Plaut stood for
the proposition that the legislature could not nullify the final word of the
judicial department in this manner. 243 However, invoking the logic of
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., the Court rejected the prisoners' claims
on the grounds that "[p]rospective relief under a continuing, executory
decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying
law.",2' That is, because the previously entered injunctions were executory
judgments subject to the continuing supervision of the issuing courts, they
were not final judgments for purposes of separation of powers analysis.245
In this way, the Court echoed the logic of an opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit written three years earlier. In
that case, involving the superintendent of a Florida state prison, the court
explained that for purposes of separation of powers analysis:
[A] true "final judgment" . . . means not an appealable
judgment, but one that represents the "last word of the
judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy." Consent decrees are final judgments, but not
the "last word of the judicial department." District courts
retain jurisdiction over such decrees not only to ensure
compliance, but also to amend them as significant changes in
law and fact require.... The PLRA's termination provision
thus does not undermine the finality of a final judgment in the
separation-of-powers sense.246
The Eighth Circuit reached the same result in a similar case, holding that
the legislature's actions could alter previously entered decrees because
such judgments were "an executory form of relief that remain[ed] subject
to later developments. 247 In short, executory judgments that are subject to
continuing review by the issuing court are deemed notfinal for purposes
of separation of powers, even though they are final for purposes of appeal.
241. Id. § 3626(e)(2).
242. Miller, 530 U.S. at 343.
243. Id. at 343-44.
244. Id at 344.
245. Id. at 347.
246. Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1426 (1 Ith Cir. 1997) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,227 (1995)).
247. Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1087 (8th Cir. 1997).
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To discern the significance of the Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.
doctrine, as elaborated by Miller, to the present inquiry, it is necessary to
evaluate the precise nature of the court order directing removal of Ms.
Schiavo's nasogastric tube. If it is a final judgment, 6 l Plaut, then it is
not subject to alteration by virtue of changes in the law enacted by the
Florida legislature. If, however, the judgment is executory, and thus
subject to continuing review of the guardianship court-much like the
consent decrees in Miller-then it would seem that the legislature could,
consistent with separation of powers principles, alter its effects through
legislation. Which type of judicial remedy is it? For the answer to this
crucial question, we need look no further than to the Florida court's own
words, quoted earlier:
The order requiring the termination of life-prolonging
procedures is not a standard legal judgment, but an order in
the nature of a mandatory injunction compelling certain
actions by the guardian and, indirectly, by the health care
providers. Until the life-prolonging procedures are
discontinued, such an order is entirely executory, and the
ward and guardian continue to be under the jurisdiction and
supervision of the guardianship court. As long as the ward is
alive, the order is subject to recall and is executory in
nature.248
Thus, it seems that the court's order to remove Ms. Schiavo's nasogastric
tube was injunctive and executory in nature, subject to continuing review
by the court and subject to recall based on changes in underlying
circumstances. By virtue of the Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. doctrine,
as elaborated by Miller, the court's order remained subject to changes in
the underlying law. Terri's Law constituted such a change in the law. In
a certain sense, the Governor's stay of the court's order in the Schiavo
matter served the same ends as the automatic stay provision of the PLRA:
to freeze and preserve the status quo such that the change in the law can
be implemented. In Miller, the change in the law included a review of the
propriety of previously entered executory decrees. In Schiavo, the change
in the law included a review of the facts and circumstances by a guardian
ad litem.
Thus, under the principles articulated in Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., as elaborated by Miller, it would seem that the Schiavo matter
presents one of the narrow classes of cases in which the legislature can,
consistent with separation of powers principles, enact legislation that alters
previous actions of the judicial branch.
248. Schiavo v. Schindler, 792 So. 2d 551, 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (emphasis added).
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B. Is Terri's Law Wise Public Policy?
Having established that the application of Terri's Law to Ms. Schiavo's
case does not run afoul of principles of separation of powers, the question
remains whether Terri's Law is normatively sound public policy from a
structural, governmental point of view. That is, does this legislative
intervention in the Schiavo matter advance the goals and logic underlying
the Florida laws governing end-of-life decisionmaking as a whole? To
address this question, it is useful to reprise briefly the substance of the
animating principles of this regulatory regime and then to measure the
effects of Terri's Law against these principles.
As discussed extensively above, the Florida laws governing end-of-life
decisionmaking for patients like Ms. Schiavo, who lack a living will or
advance directive and are unable to communicate their wishes, are aimed
chiefly at discerning and implementing the intentions of such patients.
Proxies or surrogates making decisions on behalf of such patients bear the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence-a very high
evidentiary standard-that they are choosing the option that the patient
would have chosen under the circumstances. They are not to substitute
their own wishes or views for those of the patient. Moreover, courts
weighing these claims are required to resolve any ambiguity in favor of
continuing, rather than terminating, life-sustaining measures. If the proxy
is not able to satisfy these procedural standards, the decision must be made
according to the patient's best interests. Moreover, as discussed above, the
guardianship court retains jurisdiction over the patient and her proxy, even
after it has issued an order to withdraw nutrition and hydration, in the
event that a change in the underlying facts or law would make it
inequitable to maintain the order's effect. In this way, the Florida regime
is designed to provide maximal safeguards against any possible abuse or
erroneous termination of life-sustaining measures. This is as it should be,
given the unique vulnerabilities and risks in this context. As the court in
Cruzan stated:
An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a
maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent
developments such as advancements in medical science, the
discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent,
changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the
patient despite the administration of life-sustaining treatment
at least create the potential that a wrong decision will
eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous
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decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is
not susceptible of correction.249
The legislature, in enacting Terri's Law, moved to fill a perceived void
in the extant legal framework for circumstances presenting a unique risk
of abuse or error: that is, where life-sustaining measures for an
incompetent patient with no advance directive or living will are ordered
terminated, in the face of objections by family members. There were
regulatory standards in place to provide guidance in circumstances in
which there is a designated proxy who is acting on behalf of the now-
incompetent patient. In such cases, the proxy implements the decision that
the patient would have made under the circumstances.25 ° Similarly, there
were regulatory standards in place to provide oversight for those situations
in which there is no proxy willing or able to serve in this capacity. In those
cases, decisions can be made by an appointed guardian acting in the
patient's best interests. 251' However, there were no regulatory standards to
deal precisely with the Schiavo matter, a case in which (1) the now-
incompetent patient has no living will or advance directive, (2) the patient
has no officially designated proxy, (3) the court has refused to appoint a
guardian, reserving for itself (contrary to Florida law) the authority to, in
its words, "essentially serve[] as the ward's guardian," '252 (4) not all of the
probative evidence relating to the patient's intentions has been admitted
and considered due to technical, procedural strictures, 2 3 (5) due to the
procedural posture, the burden has been shifted to the parents to argue that
Ms. Schiavo would not want to terminate nutrition and hydration, thus
inverting the logic of the Florida laws,254 and (6) the bulk of the legal and
factual dispute before the court has not focused on the question of patient
intent or best interests, as the statutory framework requires, but instead on
ancillary questions such as the patient's underlying condition and the
possible benefits of other therapies. 255 Even the court lamented that the
extant regulatory landscape did not provide an adequate process for
resolving such disputes:
It may be unfortunate that when families cannot agree, the
best forum we can offer for this private, personal decision is
249. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990).
250. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(2) (2003).
251. Id. § 765.404(1). Note, again, that judges are precluded from acting as guardians under
these circumstances. Id. § 744.309(1)(b).
252. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
253. Schindler v. Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640,643 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Schindler v. Schiavo, 792
So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
254. Schindler, 800 So. 2d at 645; Schindler, 792 So. 2d at 554.
255. Schindler, 800 So. 2d at 645.
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a public courtroom and the best decision-maker we can
provide is a judge with no prior knowledge of the ward, but
the law currently provides no better solution that adequately
protects the interests of promoting the value of life.
256
Thus, it seems that in the pre-Terri's Law regulatory regime, in which the
judicial department and litigation were the only means of resolving
disputes in this context, the values underlying the guardianship laws were
not adequately vindicated. Litigation is adversarial in nature, with stringent
procedural guidelines and rigid evidentiary rules. Standing alone, it
perhaps lacks the institutional flexibility necessary to adequately serve as
a truth-finding mechanism in a manner appropriate to the guardianship
context. The Florida Supreme Court in Satz v. Perlmutter2" echoed this
view in the following powerfully worded statement:
Because the issue [of termination of life-sustaining treatment]
with all its ramifications is fraught with complexity and
encompasses the interests of the law, both civil and criminal,
medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which is well-
suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is
the type [of] issue which is more suitably addressed in the
legislative forum, where fact finding can be less confined and
the viewpoints of all interested institutions and disciplines
can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can the
subject be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all
institutions and individuals be properly accommodated.258
Thus, the Florida legislature created a new layer of process for such cases
with its enactment of Terri's Law. In narrow circumstances, Terri's Law
allows the executive branch to appoint a guardian ad litem to review the
relevant facts and circumstances and report back to the Governor and the
chiefjudge of the relevant state court, in an effort to ensure that there has
been no error or abuse in discerning the now-incompetent patient's true
intentions or, failing that, best interests. The guardian ad litem is able to
take notice of evidence that had been procedurally defaulted during the
court proceedings, and can focus single-mindedly on questions involving
the patient's intent or failing that, her best interests, the matters at the heart
of the Florida laws governing this domain.
Interestingly, the guardianship regime seemed to anticipate the
possibility of the legislature stepping in to remedy perceived gaps in the
legal framework. As the Florida court pointed out in Schiavo I, orders
256. Schindler v. Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186-87 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
257. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
258. Id. at 360.
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issued in this context are executory in nature and thus subject to changes
in the underlying facts or law. This allowed the structural flexibility for the
legislature to intervene in a manner that is consistent with separation of
powers principles. The addition of the executive branch in this context to
administer the new legislative enactment effectively creates a system in
which all branches of government are working together to implement the
spirit of the laws themselves. Thus, with the addition of Terri's Law,
Florida's system of governance of end-of-life matters utilizes all branches
of government, each applying its own unique institutional competence to
identify and implement the wishes of the now-incompetent patient or,
failing that, seeking to act in her best interests." it is an example of the
dynamic complementarity among the branches of government
contemplated by the very doctrine of separation of powers itself. Indeed,
it promotes the central aim of separation of powers: to avoid the
concentration of power in one governmental branch and thus safeguard the
cause of liberty for all citizens.
V. POSTSCRIPT
Shortly before this Article went to press, the Florida Supreme Court
issued an opinion declaring Terri's Law unconstitutional.26 The court held
that the law violated the principle of separation of powers because it
constituted an encroachment on the authority of the judicial branch,26' and
because it delegated legislative authority to the executive branch without
providing adequate guidelines or standards for the exercise of such
authority. 26 2
The court's analysis of the judicial encroachment question was quite
spare. The court acknowledged that the key question in this context is
whether the underlying judgment is final or executory. 263 However,
without discussion (indeed without reference to any relevant precedent
whatsoever) and contrary to the logic of the Florida guardianship regime
and the clear language of the District Court of Appeal (designating its own
order as "executory"), the court simply asserted that the underlying
judgment was final for purposes of separation of powers analysis.26' For
the reasons discussed extensively above, this conclusion is erroneous.
259. At the time of this writing, Teri's Law has expired due to its sunset provision. It remains
to be seen if or how the legislature will permanently amend the guardianship and end-of-life laws
to address concerns like those presented in the Schiavo matter.
260. Bush v. Schiavo, No. SC04-925, 2004 WL 2109983 (Fla. Sept. 23, 2004).
261. See id. at *8-9.
262. See id. at *9-13.
263. Id. at *8.
264. Id.
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The court's discussion of the legislature's delegation of authority was
more extensive. The court opted to treat the law as standing alone, rather
than as a part of the larger framework of the Florida guardianship
regime.265 As such, the court concluded that the law lacked adequate
standards to guide Florida's executive branch in exercising its
discretion.266 While this is a much closer question than the judicial
encroachment issue, the court's decision to evaluate the law in the abstract
and outside of its larger regulatory context was a failure of statutory
construction. It seems clear that in enacting Terri's Law, the legislature
intended to augment the already extant regulatory mechanisms for
guardianship. Viewed in light of that overarching statutory context, it
seems that the executive's discretion was sufficiently cabined by the
clearly stated aims and objectives of Florida guardianship law, for reasons
discussed above.
Shortly after the announcement of the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion, the Governor of Florida announced his intention to appeal the
matter to the United States Supreme Court.26 7
265. See id. at *12.
266. See id. at *12-13.
267. See Mitch Stacy, Gov. Bush Granted a Stay As He Appeals Schiavo Case, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2004, at B6.

